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John Sendy’s book Comrades Come Rally has 
created considerable interest in the Labor 
Movement in Melbourne. In general, it has made a 
contribution not only to the history o f the 
Communist Party o f Australia, but also to 
enhancing the reputation of the CPA in the minds 
of many members o f the ALP. That, at any rate, 
has been my experience.
But I would like to comment on some o f the 
matters raised by Eric Aarons in his review in 
ALR No. 66. In particular, I wish to contribute a 
point of view on the split which led to the 
formation of the SPA.
Was this split inevitable? My view, for what it is 
worth, is that some people in the CPA would not 
have been able to accept the growing independent 
and critical attitudes towards the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union and would have left the 
Party. But it seems to me that this is not the main 
point.
The thing which concerns me (and John Sendy 
too, I think) was that a split was regarded as 
desirable by the majority on leading CPA bodies 
at the time.
Thus Eric Aarons, in my opinion, misses the 
point when he concedes “excesses” . An excess is a 
departure from a main orientation. In the case of 
the split with the SPA, it was the orientation 
towards a split that was wrong.
It was believed that those holding an 
“ opposition” viewpoint constituted a dead weight 
or worse on the Party, and that the sooner they got 
out and formed their own outfit the better.
I believe that these attitudes were mistaken for 
the following main reasons:
1. They took little or no account that people’s 
attitudes can change — perhaps not 180 degrees, 
but to some extent. After all, nearly all members of 
the Party holding the majority viewpoint had 
changed their view on the USSR and pretty 
rapidly at that. Our Party was relatively late in 
responding to the 1956 events and many changes 
came with a rush.
I recall the issue o f Tribune in November 1967 
when Lloyd Churchward wrote an article critical 
o f Soviet democracy. Most leading members of the 
Party were at least a little outraged. In fact, Laurie 
Carmichael — in Moscow at the time — was the 
joint author along with Pat Clancy o f a stiff reply 
to Churchward. But, to his great credit, Laurie 
C arm ich ael ch a n ged  h is  v iew . Was it 
unreasonable to expect others to do the same, 
especially after the dust settled a little on 1968?
2. That while some people may not change
their view of the USSR very much (if at all), they 
may still retain a belief in a united party, able to 
act coherently in Australian conditions. Such 
people would see how disastrous a split could be in 
reducing the effectiveness and standing o f the 
Party to which they had devoted a large part of 
their lives.
There are a number of such people who play a 
creditable part in the C PA today. There could have 
been more.
I attended several recent CPA branch meetings 
at the time o f the trials of “dissidents ” in the USSR 
and met a few people in this category. There were 
some sharp political exchanges on the above issue, 
but they did not dominate the meetings. All those 
who had a contrary view to mine were to one extent 
or another engaged in Party work.
If indeed a split was inevitable in the early 
1970s, then the question was: Would there emerge 
another Party with the numbers and the cadre 
force with ability and mass connections to be an 
effective political force to rival and harrass the 
CPA and be an effective funnel for overseas 
influence? The CPA’s desire for a split ensured a 
positive answer to this question. We became the 
assistant recruiting agents for the SPA.
But worse was to come after the split with the 
SPA, that is, the prospect o f a split between those 
with the “ good riddance” attitude and those who 
opposed it. Some of the exponents of “ good 
riddance” seemed quite calm and fatalistic about 
such a prospect.
3. A split develops a momentum of its own,
accentuating attitudes rather than moderating 
them. Both sides of the split feel the need to justify 
themselves. The person with some doubts about 
Soviet policy but with reservations about the CPA 
tends to become under the conditions of a split a 
last-ditch defender o f the indefensible aspects of 
the USSR.
As John Halfpenny has pointed out, many 
members o f the SPA privately express criticisms of 
the USSR but take a different attitude in public.
In a different way, the CPA has not succeeded 
yet in coming to terms with the Soviet reality or in 
developing the ongoing debate necessary for such 
a process.
Both these phenomena are to be explained 
largely by the split and the bad atmosphere.
Apart from that, the sag in morale following a 
split (which we all under-estimated, in my opinion) 
caused many people on both sides to drop out of 
political life.
In any case, I believe John Sendy’s book and 
Eric Aaron’s review will stimulate further 
consideration o f this period o f CPA history.
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